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Chieko KITAGAWA OTSURU* 
Introduction 
On August 6th of every summer since 194 7, on behalf of the people of Hiroshima, the 
mayor of that city has pledged to the world that they will strive to make the world a more 
peaceful place by trying to prevent the further use of nuclear weapons. The current mayor 
of Hiroshima, Tadatoshi Akiba, finds it very significant that rather than focusing on hating 
those who dropped the bomb, the victims of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima have focused 
on hoping and praying that such inhumane conduct will never be repeated. Akiba 
emphasizes that this attitude has created respect for Hiroshima and the message it sends to 
the world. 
Ever since the first atomic bomb in history was dropped in 1945, Hiroshima, along 
with Nagasaki, has been far more than just the name of a city: it has become a universally-
recognized symbol of world peace, especially during the intensification of the nuclear arms 
race in the Cold War era. It is not only those outside Hiroshima who recognize Hiroshima 
as such a symbol, but also its citizens themselves who have claimed and worked for the 
international recognition of Hiroshima as a symbol of peace. Hiroshima was reborn out of 
total devastation and its citizens needed a positive goal for its reconstruction. 
However, if peace is understood as a state of life in which everyone is free of any kind 
of stigma, not just physical but also economic, social and psychological, then Hiroshima 
itself has never been such a place. It was not until 1991 that the mayor (Takashi Hiraoka) 
included in the Peace Declaration an apology for Japan's conduct toward the victims of war 
in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, it was not until 1994 when the newly-built wing of 
the Peace Museum referred to Hiroshima as a military headquarters, a port from which 
soldiers were sent to the Asian continent, and the center of the weapons industry supported 
by non-Japanese forced labor who became dual victims of both the war and the atomic 
bomb. 
* I would like express my sincere appreciation to the individuals who understandingly accepted my request for 
interviews. I would also like to thank the staff of the database section of the Chugoku Shimbun and the staff of 
the Hiroshima City Archives for their kind cooperation in data compilation. Editorial assistance was provided 
by Dr. J. Colleen Berry of The University of Manitoba. This paper is based on research funded by the Japan Society 
for the Promotion of Scientific (JSPS) Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)# 14201024, headed by Dr. Julie 
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Moreover, it is not just pre-war history that co-exists with the peaceful image of 
Hiroshima. The following short statement that one minority citizen contributed to the local 
newspaper of Hiroshima, the Chugoku Shimbun, sums up what was happening on the 
ground in post-war Hiroshima: "We believed that the atomic bomb had destroyed 
everything in Hiroshima, but in the midst of total destruction, discrimination remained" 
(Chugoku Shimbun, August 1, 1969). 
This paper looks beneath the symbols of Hiroshima at what they conceal, and 
discusses what the idea of a symbol for peace meant to the citizens of Hiroshima as they 
reconstructed their city from total devastation. It also examines the values that the citizens 
as well as the government of Hiroshima hope to use to appeal to the world through the 
creation of "Peaceful Hiroshima," and what is missing from that appeal. By so doing, I 
would like to point out the unintended but nonetheless negative role a symbol can play in 
public space and the impact it has had on the part of Hiroshima's population which remains 
stigmatized. I also hope to show how we could have avoided, and in the future can avoid 
these pitfals. 
1. Hiroshima as Symbol: The Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Act 
a. Symbol Making 
Given the unprecedented degree of annihilation caused by the use of the atomic bomb 
for the first time in history, it might seem quite natural that Hiroshima would become a 
symbol of world peace. The experience of the war and the devastation made the people of 
Hiroshima aim for "a symbol of the attempt to achieve eternal peace." On the first 
anniversary of the atomic bombing, 7000 people of Hiroshima gathered at the Gokoku 
Shrine (used as army headquarters til the end of the war), and confirmed the desire of al 
the citizens to reconstruct the city. Their slogan was "Pursue the justice of compassion, put 
every effort into mutual support and the construction of an ideal city, and look ahead to its 
realization" (Chugoku Shimbun, August 6, 1946). 
The steps taken toward what later became the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City 
Construction Act reveals, however, that making Hiroshima the symbol of world peace was 
also based on pragmatic political considerations insofar as status supported by special law 
would make it easier to obtain the funding and. land for reconstruction from the central 
government. Even as late as 1949, the reconstruction of Hiroshima was stil not proceeding 
smoothly. Hiroshima had sent a petition to the national Diet asking for special support, but 
no action had been taken by the central government. 
Instead of repeatedly sending petitions, a new idea was proposed: to request 
legislation by the Diet members solely for the reconstruction of Hiroshima. However, 
under the occupation by American troops, it would have been almost impossible to refer to 
the atomic bombing as the basis for this special legislation. So the term "eternal peace" 
was taken from Article 9 of the new Constitution, causing Hiroshima's request to transcend 
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its local origins and focus on the wellbeing of al people (Hiroshima City 1989, 3-19). 
By constitutional requirement, legislation which is applicable only to a specific local 
body should be agreed to by the local residents. Thus upon the passage of the Hiroshima 
Peace Memorial City Construction Act, a referendum was carried out on July 7, 1949, and 
there was an intensive drive to get out the vote preceding the referendum, resulting in a 
support rate of 91 % by the voters. 
A poster mobilizing citizens to vote for the referendum on the 
Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Act (1949) 
Source: NIRA and Hiroshima Prefecture (2002, 83) 
The act of casting their own vote supporting the law strengthened the determination of 
the citizens of Hiroshima to serve as the symbol of world peace, and to uphold the spirit of 
the law they had just voted for. Tadashi Teramitsu, who drafted this legislation, stated that 
Peace Memorial City should not just look back at the past and memorialize it, but should 
present a design for peace which would go beyond the atomic bomb and August 6th 
(Hiroshima City 1989, 16). 
This task assigned to the citizens of Hiroshima by this piece of legislation was well 
expressed in a Chugoku Shimbun editorial: 
We expect that the construction of this city of peace will be supported and realized 
not by movements or the claims of those of limited circles, but by the opinion and 
discussion of the citizens at large…. In order to make Hiroshima truly a city of 
peace, its citizens should understand the ideal of peace behind it which entails 
overcoming selfishness, extending democratic mutual assistance, and forming a true 
community based on compassion, rather than on superficial cooperation or charity 
(March 30, 1949). 
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b. The Symbol in Place 
In 1965, when the Hiroshima Branch of NHK, Japan's public broadcasting 
corporation, carried a series of special programs on the meaning of Hiroshima as a city of 
peace, reaction outside Hiroshima varied from admiration for the genuine desire for peace 
on the part of the people of Hiroshima, to a more cynical view that Hiroshima was trying 
making money from the atomic bomb and the idea of peace. Some even said out that 
calling the bombed city a city of peace was hypocritical (Chugoku Shimbun, August 3, 
1965). 
The process of how this ideal of peace was materialized cannot be explained only as 
a matter involving the local people of Hiroshima because it was also a reflection of the 
complexity of international political developments in the Cold War: Hiroshima was not just 
the symbol of peace for the citizens of Hiroshima, but became a symbol for the anti-nuclear 
movement, whose members focused more on their own political turf wars than on the 
victims themselves. 
When the former mayor of Hiroshima, Takashi Hiraoka, was a staff writer for the 
Chugoku Shimbun, he was quite critical of political movements outside of Hiroshima for 
their use of Hiroshima as a symbol. He pointed out that Hiroshima as symbol should stand 
for the inhumane conditions caused by the logic of power based on nuclear weapons, and 
that there were thus actually numerous "Hiroshimas" and "Nagasakis" in the world 
(Hiraoka 1972, 91). But the anti-nuclear movement regarded Hiroshima and Nagasaki as 
being sacred in and of. themselves. They emphasized the suffering of the atomic bomb 
victims (Hiraoka 1972, 266) rather than applying the logic of power to other cases and 
empathizing with similar sufferings; an approach which therefore failed to universalize the 
symbolic meaning of Hiroshima. 
Mr. Lee Sil Gun, president of the Council of Atom-bombed Korean in Hiroshima 
Prefecture, commenting on the lessening of interest in Hiroshima especially in the post 9-
1 era, recalls what went wrong with using the atomic bomb victims of Hiroshima in an 
appeal for peace: 
It only stressed the aspect of victimization and never presented the idea of peace 
that transcends individual experience. The movement should have asked why 
Hiroshima happened, including its military role and the existence of forced labor 
brought from Korea and China (Lee interview). 
This image of the people of Hiroshima as victims helped its citizens overlook the fact 
that there were those who were doubly victimized in the community, and that the people of 
Hiroshima were also responsible for the well being of those dual victims. While the atomic 
bomb victims suffered various types of discrimination as a result of the having been 
bombed (the bomb victims were the targets of discrimination for their physical looks, 
unknown genetic conditions, and by the fact that some could not lead a normal life due to 
the fatigue caused by the radiation), among them were people who were discriminated 
against even further, namely the segregated populations of buraku (historically 
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discriminated people based on their native land) and Korean peoples. While most people 
fled Hiroshima after the atomic bomb and did not return for some time, the buraku people 
had nowhere to go, so they returned and built houses while the rest of the city was stil an 
expanse of utter devastation (Tasaka 2000, 121). The Korean population also suffered this 
dual discrimination. 
The Japanese feeling toward Korean atomic bomb victims had a double twist. People 
who were not victims of the bombing envied the victims once the compensation from the 
government was paid because the victims'medical treatment was free and they received 
pensions. But Japanese people were strongly opposed to the use of their tax money to pay 
for non-Japanese victims, even though the Korean victims had been forced to come to 
Japan to work due to policies of the Japanese government. Most people were simply not 
interested in, and thus not conscious of the existence of the non-Japanese residents in Japan 
because in early post-war Hiroshima they were too preoccupied with just trying to find 
ways to survive on a daily basis (Kang interview). 
On the 25th anniversary of the bombing, the Chugoku Shimbun carried an article 
stating that the Korean victims, both those who died and those who survived, have not had 
a place in Japanese discussions of the atomic bomb and Hiroshima. For example, not one 
line referring to Koreans victims of the atomic bomb can be found in The Newly Edited 
History of Hiroshima or A Medical History of the Hiroshima Atomic Bomb. The Japanese 
people have excised their wartime history and view their modem history only from the end 
of the war, thereby exempting themselves of responsibility and relying comfortably on the 
formulaic statement that Hiroshima stands for peace. That is why the question of Korean 
victims was never taken up by the Japanese side (Chugoku Shimbun, August 1, 1970). 
Professor Masaharu Watanabe of Hiroshima University was also quoted as saying that 
without facing the question of Japanese responsibility toward Korean victims, there will 
never be a true solution to the matter of the atomic bomb victims (Chugoku Shimbun, 
August 1, 1969). 
One Korean resident made a critical comment to the Chugoku Shimbun about the 
superficial tatk of "Peaceful Hiroshima," saying that there were serious divisions in 
Hiroshima's civil society and unless al of Hiroshima's citizens became aware of those 
divisions and stood up for integration, peace would never become a reality (Chugoku 
Shimbun, July 28, 1955). The following chapter takes up one of the issues dividing 
Hiroshima. 
2. Hiroshima as Reality: The Case of the Atomic Slum 
a. Erasing the Unwelcome 
As Japan's economy continued to expand in the 1960s, Hiroshima was transformed 
from a site of the devastation of war into an urban center. That change, however, did not 
occur evenly, but re-emphasized the existing stigma borne by certain parts of the 
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population, which led to efforts by the city to conceal it. One of the most conspicuous cases 
of concealment may be the disappearance of the "atomic slum." 
What is known as the atomic slum was constructed on the bank of the Motoyasu River 
between Aioi Bridge and Misasa Bridge, or Aioi Dori. In the spring of 194 7, about 20 
households were observed residing there, and these grew to about 1,400 households by the 
1950s. Among the residents were those who suffered from dual discrimination, namely the 
Korean victims of the atomic bomb. Thus in the early 1960s, the row of ilegal residences 
on Aioi Dori was widely known as "Atomic Slum." The area on which the atomic slum 
was constructed, Motomachi, was originally a military headquarters area, which was 
supposed to have been turned into a park without residences. But due to the lack of housing 
immediately following the war, the city started to construct temporary public housing in 
this area, which attracted ilegal construction as well. 
In order to absorb the residents of the ilegal housing, the city started to construct new 
apartment buildings in the mid-1960s. As the construction of the new buildings created an 
even sharper contrast between the clean, new structures and the dirty, older ones, the 
construction of more buildings was planned to absorb al the residents of the ilegal 
structures. The planned housing structures were high-rise apartment buildings that would 
be high as 20 stories, with an average living space of about 40 square meters. The 
population density in the housing complex was 1,258/hectare. 
As shown in these data, the Motomachi high-rise apartment buildings were built with 
cost-and space-effectiveness in mind, without taking into account cultural considerations 
or the way the apartments would feel to the residents. The apartment buildings now stand 
so high and wide that they almost look like a screen which cuts off al views of the 
surrounding mountains. The individual rooms are very small with no bathrooms and, since 
the floors are so high, human contact and communication have been difficult from the 
beginning. This situation became even worse as the residents aged and found it difficult to 
go downstairs to meet others. 
Even though some people started to living in the atomic slum thinking their stay 
would be only temporary, the area created its own community over time and that 
community would have been lost if the residents had moved away. Some residents did not 
mind moving out of the illegal housing structures, but they did not want to move into the 
narrow, closed space of the high rises. 
The city administration repeatedly pressured them to move out, and even sent official 
leters asking for the restitution payments for illegally occupying public land. The residents 
of the atomic slum formed the Motomachi Area Housing Construction Promotion 
Association and asked for special rent consideration in the new housing, since one third of 
the slum residents were atomic bomb victims who were in severe financial straits 
(Hiroshima City 1983a, 139). 
In July 1967, there was a huge fire and 1 71households lost their residences. In April 
of the following year, there was another huge fire and 37 households lost their residences. 
?Hiroshima as Symbol, Hiroshima as Reality: 
Challenges for Integration in the Post-War City of Peace 
The city claimed that it would be next to impossible to prevent further fires since the ilegal 
residences were built with flammable materials and were stacked right up next to each 
other. It also claimed that the sanitary conditions of the slum were unacceptable. The 
timing of the fires was such that it was even rumored that the fire had been set intentionally 
to force the residents to move out of the structures. 
As the renovations of Aioi Dori were proceeding, Professor Oyabu of Osaka City 
University undertook research on the residents of the atomic slum in 1967, and his work 
was continued by a Hiroshima University team. In 1970, students of Hiroshima University 
and Hiroshima Women's University identified over 1400 Korean victims of the atomic 
bomb including those living in the atomic slum, and interviewed about 100 of them to 
determine, for the first time, the state of the Korean victims of the atomic bomb. They 
concluded that the research clearly demonstrated that the Japanese were responsible for 
what had happened to the Korean victims. They also stated that discrimination against 
Koreans, which many believed had been erased in devastation of the bombing, was alive 
and well, and that the facts of this matter should be brought to the attention of the people of 
Hiroshima. 
Work on the plan for total renovation was started in 1969, and covered as much as 
33.36 hectares (4.93 hectares on the river bank), or 2,600 households (800 on the river 
bank) (Hiroshima City and Hiroshima Prefecture 1978, 7-11). By 1977, almost al the 
ilegal residences had been removed. The way the illegal residences were removed made it 
look more like the city was trying to forget what Hiroshima had stood for to those people 
who had suffered discrimination, and to forget about the very existence of those people. 
But the Chugoku Shimbun quoted a former resident who was an atomic bomb victim, 
saying that "the scar would never be erased" by the removal of the ilegal residences 
(Chugoku Shimbun, August 6, 1977). 
A Bird View and the Plan of Aioi Dori and Motomachi Housing Complex 
Source: Hiroshima City (1978, 3-4) 
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b. Issues That Stil Remain 
Aioi Dori, the atomic slum, was once characterized as the comer of the world that the 
unwanted and powerless were swept into (Yamashiro 1965, vi). In the early post-war 
years, the victims of the atomic bomb were not provided with any support by the 
government, and during the occupation period, information on the atomic bomb was not 
shared openly and no criticism of the bomb was permitted by the General Headquarters 
(Cf. Takahashi 2003). Thus an accurate understanding of the victims of the atomic bomb 
was not shared among the citizens, which accelerated the discrimination against them. It is 
often forgotten that the bomb victims were the targets of discrimination due to physical 
disfiguration, possible genetic damage, and the fatigue from radiation which made a 
normal life impossible. These grounds for discrimination also resulted in even worse 
financial conditions for many of the victims. Later, as official indemnification started, the 
victims became the target of jealousy by other citizens, many of whom also suffered from 
economic hardship but were not provided with official assistance. 
As mentioned above, about one third of those living on the river bank were atomic 
bomb victims. As the atomic slum community disbanded with some residents moving out 
to the suburbs, and many others moving into the high-rise housing, the nature of this 
community was carried over to the new housing complex. It seems that the high-rise 
apartment housing, with its living conditions that are far below the average for Japanese 
today, has now become housing for non-Japanese residents. First Aioi Dori and then the 
Motomachi high-rises have functioned as a place where those suffering at the moment 
gather and live (Kang interview). Instead of integrating the differences in a positive way, 
the community of Hiroshima, it seems, stil faces the same old problem of exclusion of 
minorities. 
Having become aware of this remaining issue, though, Hiroshima is trying to grow out 
of being such a closed community. In the following chapter we will consider what has 
changed and is changing. 
3. Making the Symbol Itself Speak: A Positive Move for True Peace 
a. Reclaiming Rights 
It has been estimated that the Korean population numbered over 20,000 when the 
atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, but there was no substantial research on the 
Korean atomic bomb victims carried out immediately following the war. It was not until 
1968 that a memorial ceremony for the Korean victims of the bomb was conducted 
independently from the annual ceremony by the city of Hiroshima. At that same time, 
planning for construction of the Monument in Memory of the Korean Victims along with 
other monuments in the Peace Memorial Park was proceeding. The city of Hiroshima 
claimed that al atomic bomb victims, including Koreans, were recorded on the Memorial 
Monument so there was no need for separate monument. But the Korean side felt that the 
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Memorial Monument did not adequately meet their needs since the context in which they 
were bombed was quite different from that of the Japanese residents of Hiroshima 
(Chugoku Shinbun, October 17, 1969). They needed to begin their story by explaining why 
they were in Hiroshima in the first place. 
The city of Hiroshima did not allow the Korean Monument to be constructed inside 
the park, saying that a new ordinance prohibited any further construction inside Peace 
Memorial Park. However, despite that ordinance, other new construction was actually 
permitted, and the establishment of the ordinance as well as its strict application to the 
Korean Monument reveals the discriminatory attitude of the city (Oh interview). This was 
also said to be due to the division of Hiroshima's Korean population between the North 
Korean side and the South Korean side, both of which claimed to be the legitimate 
representatives of the Korean population. The monument was finally built on the river bank 
across from Peace Memorial Park. While Chairman Cho of the Korean Monument 
Construction Committee regretted the fact that the monument had to be constructed outside 
the park, he also expressed relief on the part of the Korean community as they were finally 
able to carry out the obligations they felt to their compatriots who were lost in the bombing 
(Chugoku Shimbun, October 17, 1969). 
Korean Monument outside Peace Memorial Park came to be seen as the symbol of 
discrimination. It was not just Korean people who felt that way, but also some Japanese 
who visited Hiroshima Peace Memorial. In fact, according to one person interviewed, the 
Korean people had become so accustomed to the discrimination that it never occurred to 
them to make an appeal for their rights, and that it was actually Japanese students on a 
school trip who started the public outcry that the Korean monument standing on the 
opposite bank of the Peace Memorial Park represented ethnic discrimination (Oh 
interview). In 1990, South Korea's President Noh visited Hiroshima, and the monument 
was finally moved inside the park. 
The monument issue presented an opportunity for the people of Hiroshima to think 
about what their city as symbol should mean in their own community. The Chugoku 
Shimbun (May 19, 1990) carried an article criticizing the superficiality of Hiroshima's 
message which failed to include Koreans in the community. The article stated, "The city 
continued to take a stubborn stance, and'the Heart of Hiroshima'that Mayor Araki 
referred to were just words; we were so unaware of the how psychologically hurt those 
minority people were. 
In 1998, Mayor Hiraoka decided to move toward relocation of the monument and 
started discussions with both Korean organizations. In 1999, the monument was finally 
moved. From the time of President Noh's visit, it had taken almost an entire decade. One of 
the difficulties was caused by the North-South division of Korean residents in Hiroshima, 
with the North claiming that the message of the monument was one-sided and represented 
only the South. Relocation was accomplished based on an agreement that a unified 
monument representing both the North and the South would be constructed in the near 
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future. The following year there was a positive move in this direction, with the North-South 
summit meeting that took place on the Korean Peninsula. For the first time, an official 
representative of the North attended the memorial ceremony of the South on the evening of 
August 6 (Asahi Shimbun, August 6, 2001). 
Monument to the Korean Victims of the Atomic Bomb, taken by the author 
(moved inside Peace Memorial Park in 1999) 
The monument issue did not end with the moving of the monument. The movement 
worked as catalyst to raise Korean people's awareness of the fact that they could claim 
their rights in the public space. It is often the case that those who face constant 
discrimination do not even realize that their rights are being denied since, from the start, 
they are unaware that they even have those rights. Thus the first step toward empowerment 
was consciousness raising among the Korean population about their rights and how to 
claim them (Oh interview). 
As Hiroshima was to host Asian Games in 1994, the city became more conscious of 
its non-Japanese residents, and started to pay more attention to its minority population. In 
1990, the city's official newspaper first referred to "multi-ethnic co-existence," and rights-
consciousness training for the staff started in the early 1990s. Mr. Oh Son Dok, Vice 
President of the Association for the Human Rights of Koreans in Japan voiced his feeling 
that the people of Hiroshima had not consciously discriminated against minority peoples, 
but their lack of interest even in the very existence of those people made their situation 
even worse (Oh interview). 
One of the positive developments in Hiroshima's multi-ethnic co-existence was the 
survey of the non-Japanese residents conducted by the city. Although the state of minority 
people in Hiroshima is stil far from satisfactory, many respondents said that the fact that 
the city was making efforts to relate to the minority population was an encouraging sign 
(Hiroshima City 2003). 
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b. Toward a Positive Contribution 
Today, Hiroshima characterizes itself not just as a "peace city," but as an 
"international culture-of-peace city." In 1982, when the Second United Nations Special 
Session for Disarmament was held, Japan sent a petition as a nation that had suffered from 
atomic bombing. The people of Hiroshima were very active in the petition drive, and one of 
the organizations involved in the drive expressed the desire for the circle to include non-
Japanese residents, especially Korean and other Asian residents of Hiroshima, thus 
bridging the Japanese and non-Japanese populations (Chugoku Shimbun March 13, 1978). 
Despite these conscious efforts toward integration, most of the "internationalization" 
efforts have been directed outwardly and have dealt with how Hiroshima connects with 
foreign nations. For example, The New History of Hiroshima carries page after page of lists 
of visitors to Hiroshima from abroad and the places Hiroshima's representatives have 
visited, including the visits to two of its friendship cities, Honolulu and Volgograd 
(Hiroshima City 1983b, 250-255). Hiroshima's contacts with other countries have, of 
course, resulted in some very important contributions. One example is the Akiba Project 
which invited journalists from abroad to visit Hiroshima in order to give them first-hand 
experience in this city that suffered an atomic bombing. They were then asked to let the 
citizens of their own countries know what they had learned. 
In response to this invitation of foreign journalists in 1982, the citizens of the city 
proposed ways to promote Hiroshima's internationalization. One of the proposals that was 
adopted stated: Hiroshima has a tendency to reject the differences which stand in the way 
of internationalization. Before Hiroshima can be internationalized, we have to rectify this 
situation here at home. Otherwise the city will only be an "international city of peace" on 
the surface (Chugoku Shimbun, April 20, 1982). 
It has not been through the government, but rather through NGOs that Hiroshima has 
attempted to reach out to the world in a positive way using its symbolic status. On the eve 
of the attack against Iraq in 2003, NGOs in Hiroshima gathered to protest against the use of 
depleted uranium (DU). DU isnot officially recognized by U.S. government as posing a 
radioactive threat to the human body, but many scientists and physicians have produced 
data documenting the high probability of this. Although DU isnot categorized as nuclear 
weapon in the strictest sense, the suffering of the Iraqi people caused by DU isparallel to 
that of the atomic bomb victims, and the people of Hiroshima feel a responsibility to stop 
its use. The Japanese government has sent medical teams to "treat" Iraqi victims, but the 
first step should be to stop the use of DU rather than to just treat the consequences. 
As the case of DU demonstrates, when Hiroshima's role in these matters is discussed, 
the priorities appear to be reversed insofar as the results are dealt with before the causes. 
Another example is the more general matter of post-conflict reconstruction and the light 
that Hiroshima's post-bombing reconstruction can shed on other cases. The message that 
Hiroshima as a symbol sends to the world should not be that reconstruction out of 
annihilation is possible, but rather that annihilation itself is inhumane and abhorrent and 
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that we should make every effort to stop it. Moreover, what seemed to be a successful 
reconstruction in Hiroshima has never actually been so successful if we look beneath the 
surface, as the previous parts of this paper have shown. This caveat, based on Hiroshima's 
experience, however, takes a back seat when the symbol is used to a positive message to 
the world. 
The Hiroshima prefectural government invited the United Nations Institute for 
Training and Research (UNITAR) to set up a training center in Hiroshima, in part to 
address the issue mentioned above. Preceding the hosting of UNITAR, Japan's National 
Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) and Hiroshima Prefecture carried out a joint 
study to find out what the Japan's experience, and Hiroshima's in particular, might 
contribute to post-conflict reconstruction cases that the United Nations is dealing with 
(NIRA and Hiroshima Prefecture 2002). It is not just the symbolic aspect of Hiroshima's 
reconstruction that the study focuses on, but the reality of human nature that the people of 
Hiroshima had to deal with, including the long process of overcoming deep-seated 
discrimination. All of this should provide invaluable lessons for conflict-ridden societies: 
reconstruction should start with conscious efforts at co-existing with others. 
Dr. Haruhiro Fukui, director of the Peace Center of Hiroshima City University, 
regards both Hiroshima the place and Hiroshima the symbol as two separate, co-existing 
cities. The former represents the physical residential area where its citizens live, while the 
later represents the record of the peculiar tragedy experienced by the place itself and its 
citizens. Hiroshima the place is a normal local city, but Hiroshima the symbol makes this 
city unique in the world as it testifies to and shows the world the tragedy of war, especially 
in this age of nuclear weapons (Fukui 2003). 
It must be pointed out, however, that there would have been no victims without the 
existence of aggressors (Li interview). The missing piece in Hiroshima's reconstruction, a 
piece stil missing in the Hiroshima's proposed contribution, is the question of 
responsibility for actions taken during the war and even blame for the war itself. 
Conclusion 
There was a project conducted by Hiroshima Shudo University in 1982 which 
analyzed the relationship between the experience of the atomic bombing and the social life 
of Hiroshima. The analysis reveals that the experience of the bombing has worked to 
integrate the society of Hiroshima, but at the same time, it has made the message of 
Hiroshima tilt toward specificity and the past rather than toward universality and the future. 
In other words, more people in Hiroshima associate the symbolic meaning of Hiroshima 
with the individual victims of the atomic bomb rather than humanity at large, and as a 
prayer for those who were lost rather than the construction of peace. 
In fact, it is impossible to make the actual Hiroshima, the people on the ground of 
Hiroshima, into an abstract symbol. For every atomic bomb victim there is a face, a feeling, 
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a memory, a dream: each completely different than the other victims. It was politically 
necessary to group them together as atomic bomb victims and emphasize their sufferings, 
and to make them into a sacred symbol for world peace. That did bring about a positive 
outcome, but it also concealed other problems. Former Mayor Hiraoka recalls that the very 
fact that Hiroshima became the symbol of world peace deprived the atomic bomb victims 
of the opportunity to let out their own feelings, and the rest of the citizens of Hiroshima to 
treat them as individual human beings (Hiraoka interview). This is one of the functions that 
symbol plays in the public space, even though it is not intended by any of the actors. 
It is not the atomic bomb itself that annihilated the people of Hiroshima. The atomic 
bomb just happens to be one of the cruelest and most inhumane weapons and this was its 
first use in the human history. That fact itself has grave significance, but if Hiroshima is to 
send universal message, the meaning of Hiroshima should start with the process of war, 
reaching al the way to the dropping of the atomic bomb. A bomb does not fal on anyone 
out of the blue. Without eradicating the root causes for Hiroshima, that is, war itself and the 
failure of human efforts to solve our differences based on respect for the dignity of others, 
we will not be able to prevent the occurrence of many more "Hiroshimas" and 
Nagasakis. 
Stil, the use of symbol can be a dynamic process. We can discuss how the symbol of 
Hiroshima has transformed over time from a majority-centered, victim-minded one to a 
minority-included, positive, responsible one, at least to some extent, and how it can stil 
change further. Both the end of Cold War as an international political context and the 
empowerment of a minority inside Hiroshima worked to effect this transformation. This 
dynamic process should be the positive lesson Hiroshima can present to the world, since 
the true meaning of peace is not just the absence of fighting, let alone victory in such 
fighting as the current U.S. government claims, but a state in which the dignity of each 
individual is respected equally. 
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Appendix: 
1) Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law 
Owing to the loss of al of its sources of revenue in World War I and the inflation that came with the 
end of the war, Hiroshima found itself in dire financial straits, lacking the resources to undertake 
reconstruction. The Japanese government itself was on the verge of bankruptcy, with so many other cities 
also in desperate need of reconstruction funds. Although there was a general recognition that the 
devastation of Hiroshima was of a greater magnitude than that of other cities, special legislation was 
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required for the city to receive preferential assistance. 
After extensive efforts, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law was enacted on 
August 6, 1949, the fourth anniversary of the atomic bombing. For the purpose of rebuilding Hiroshima as 
a symbol of eternal peace, former military and other lands owned by the national government were 
transferred to the city as part of a set of measures giving it preferential assistance. In accordance with the 
legislation, the Japanese Ministry of Finance imposed restrictions on the use of the military land, with 
some to be used for the construction of roads, parks, open spaces, tracts of greenery, and water supply and 
sewerage facilities, and some to be used for the construction of designated facilities to establish Hiroshima 
as a peace memorial city. 
2) Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Plan 
In conformance with the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law, the Hiroshima Peace 
Memorial City Construction Plan was adopted in 1952. It specified the following measures: 
1. The building of a park of 12.21 hectares in the Nakajima District near the hypocentre of the atomic 
bomb explosion, to be designated a memorial and called Peace Memorial Park. 
2. The designation of an area of 58.74 hectares (44.1 hectares in the present plan), including the site of 
Hiroshima Castle, to be called Chuo Park, and the creation of many other parks in the city. 
3. The planning of green tracts along the rivers to beautify the rivers flowing through the city from north to 
south, and the preservation of tracts of wooded areas in the surrounding mountains. 
4. The laying of arterial roads in a grid using as an axis the 100-metre-wide road which runs through the 
centre of the city from east to west. 
5. The establishment of an efficient sewerage and drainage system (necessary since most of the city proper 
lies on a delta). 
